








Information Acquisition in Double Auctions
Tri Vi Dang∗
July 2007
I am indebted to Martin Hellwig for critical discussions and ongoing suggestions. I thank Ernst
Ludwig von Thadden for comments. Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG) and Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.
∗, email: dang@pool.uni-mannheim.de
                 This Draft: May 2007 
Information Acquisition in Double Auctions* 
Tri Vi Dang 
University of Mannheim 
Abstract
This paper analyses information acquisition in the Reny and Perry 
(2006) type double auction environment and shows that an  
efficient and fully revealing equilibrium may fail to exist if 
information is endogenous and costly. As the number of traders 
increases, the equilibria are inefficient even though the information 
cost is very large. Because of endogenous noise trading, the price is 
also not fully revealing. This paper provides a strategic foundation 
for Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and discusses some market 
microstructure implications. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:  C78, D82, D83 
Key words:  double auction, efficiency, endogenous lemons problem, information 
acquisition
___________________
* I thank Martin Hellwig and Ernst Ludwig von Thadden for comments and suggestions. Financial support 
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim, and the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged. Postal address: L7, 3-5, 
68131 Mannheim, Germany. Email: dang@pool.uni-mannheim.de     
11. Introduction 
Agents trading financial assets typically face common values uncertainty because the cash 
flow stream of a financial asset is risky. In secondary markets the seller does not necessarily 
posses better information about the value of the asset than a potential buyer but the agents on 
both sides of  the market can acquire information before they trade. This paper analyzes 
information acquisition and trade in the Reny and Perry (2006) type double auction 
environment.1
Reny and Perry (2006) analyze information aggregation and efficiency in a large 
double auction and show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in pure monotone bidding 
functions exits, the equilibrium outcome is arbitrarily close to an efficient and fully revealing 
rational expectations equilibrium. In their model the diverse information of the traders are 
exogenous. This paper assumes that all traders have symmetric information ex ante but both 
the buyers and the sellers can acquire information about the value of the asset before they 
trade. This paper analyses the implications of endogenous information acquisition for 
allocative and informational efficiency in small and large double auctions where all liquidity 
traders behave strategically. This paper contains two parts. 
The first part analyses information acquisition in a double auction with one liquidity 
buyer and one liquidity seller and shows that two types of inefficiencies may arise.2 (1) If the 
information cost is low, then in a BNE with trade both traders acquire socially useless 
information. The motive for information acquisition is driven by the desire to trade without 
being exploited. In such an equilibrium the price is fully revealing. There is no inverse 
relation between informationally efficient prices and the compensation for information cost 
because the traders receive enough compensation when they realize the trading gains.  
(2) If the information cost is in an intermediate range, then no pure strategy BNE 
with efficient trade exists although the traders maintain symmetric information in 
equilibrium and the trading gains are common knowledge. This paper shows that an 
endogenous lemons problem, i.e. the concern of suffering a potential speculative loss due to 
1 Liquidity motives such as portfolio rebalance needs, tax-induced trades, and dividend-captured trades give 
rise to mutually beneficial transactions. The demand for financial analysts’ coverage and Bloomberg’s and 
Reuters’ financial services suggest that information acquisition is a prevalent activity on financial markets.    
2 A small double auction or simultaneous offer bargaining can be interpreted as a model of over-the-counter-
trading. Bargaining is a standard feature in many decentralized markets, such as those for corporate bonds, 
derivatives, mortgage-backed securities, currencies, and real estate. See Duffie et al. (2005). 
2the mere possibility of information acquisition by the other trader, can already render 
efficient trade unattractive.3
If the traders randomize information acquisition and their offer prices, then trade 
occurs with positive probability. The outcome in a mixed strategy BNE has the following 
properties. (1) The motive for information acquisition is to exploit the other trader. If trade 
occurs, then an informed trader makes some speculative profits. In particular, no trade occurs 
if both traders are informed in a mixed strategy equilibrium. (2) The behavior of an 
uninformed trader exhibits endogenous noise trading in the sense that he proposes with 
positive probability an offer which is prone to speculation and may suffer a speculative loss. 
(3) The equilibrium payoff of an uninformed trader is non-negative because there is a 
positive probability that his trading partner is also uninformed so that he realizes the trading 
gain without suffering a speculative loss. (4) The equilibrium price is not fully revealing. If 
the price was fully revealing, then an uninformed trader would know for sure that he suffers 
a speculative loss given that his offer is vulnerable to speculation. 
The second part of the paper extends the two trader case to a double auction with 
many traders and shows that a large double auction market may not be able to mitigate the  
inefficiencies in the small double auction, but it may even perform worse. In decentralized 
trading, if the information cost is large, then the buyer and the seller trade without costly 
information acquisition. In centralized trading on a large market, this efficient equilibrium 
fails to exist even though the information cost is very large.  
As the number of buyers and sellers increases, if a trader can trade several units in a 
large market, then the potential speculative profits of an informed trader increases because 
there are potentially more uninformed traders to exploit. Therefore, the potential speculative 
threat an uninformed trader faces exists not only for low information costs, but also for very 
large information cost. In such a case only mixed strategy equilibria exist in which a fraction 
of liquidity traders does not trade and the price is not fully revealing. This paper shows that 
an efficient and fully revealing equilibrium in the Reny and Perry (2006) type double auction 
environment may fail to exist if information is endogenous and costly.4
3 This no trade result is different from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) because the gains from trade are 
common knowledge in the present model. This result is also different from Akerlof (1970) and Gresik (1991) 
since the traders possess symmetric information about the common valuation in the no trade equilibrium. 
4 The reason why Reny and Perry (2006) result at the double auction stage does not apply to this setting is the 
following. In their model it is common knowledge that the traders have private information and a pure strategy 
BNE exists. In this model information acquisition is not observable. From a strategic perspective, this model 
can be interpreted as one-stage game with two action variables, namely choosing information acquisition and 
3This model can be regarded as a strategic version of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
who analyze information acquisition within the noisy rational expectations equilibrium 
framework with no explicit market mechanism. They assume that the liquidity traders 
neither consider information acquisition nor care about prices but just want to trade. The 
rational players in their model are the speculators without real trading motive. They acquire 
information to exploit the noisy liquidity traders.5 This paper endogenizes their noise trading 
assumption as well as provides a strategic foundation for their so-called impossibility result 
of informationally efficient prices. 
In the present model there are no noise traders in the market initially since all 
liquidity traders behave strategically. The intuition why no pure strategy BNE exists and the 
price is not fully revealing is the following. Suppose the price is fully revealing. Then there 
is free-riding in the sense that not acquiring information is a profitable deviation. As the 
number of informed traders decreases, the remaining informed traders can move prices and 
makes speculative profits. Therefore, no pure strategy BNE exists. As in a small double 
auction, there is endogenous noise trading and the price is not fully revealing in a mixed 
strategy BNE.
This paper is also related to the literature on information acquisition in auctions. 
Milgrom (1981), Matthews (1984), Hausch and Li (1993), and Persico (2000) analyse 
information acquisition in auctions where only the buyers’ side considers information 
acquisition while the seller is non-strategic or noisy. Since the seller just wants to sell his 
asset holding, trade always occurs but the bidders acquire (socially wasteful) information in 
equilibrium.6 In contrast, this model assumes that all traders behave strategically and can 
acquire information. A strategic buyer (seller) may not want to buy (sell) and is willing to 
forgo the gain due to the endogenous lemons problem. The two-sided strategic behavior 
(even with exogenous private information) gives rise to some technical difficulties since the 
random variables or so-called order statistics are not affiliated. Reny and Perry (2006) 
provide a new technique to solve for an equilibrium in the large limit market.  
offer prices. In a mixed strategy equilibrium a trader is not able to infer the information of the other traders 
from observing the price. On the other hand, if information is costless then as in Reny and Perry (2006), an 
efficient and fully revealing BNE exists. 
5 Under these assumptions they show that the equilibrium price is not fully revealing. If noise vanishes, then the 
market breaks down. See also Hellwig (1982), Verrecchia (1982) and Barlevy  and Veronesi (2000). 
6 Bergemann and Valimäki (2002) employ a local efficiency concept and show that any ex post efficient 
allocation mechanism causes an ex ante information acquisition inefficiency.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
basic model. Section 3 analyzes information acquisition in a small double auction. Section 4 
analyses information acquisition in large double auctions. Section 5 discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some market microstructure implications. 
2. The Basic Model 
Two risk neutral traders seek to agree on a price p at which to trade one unit of an asset. It is 
common knowledge that the asset is worth v+? to the buyer and v?? to the seller where ?>0
is a constant and v is the uncertain common value component which is either vL or vH with 
equal probability and vH>vL>?. In addition, ?< 81 (vH?vL) (Assumption 1).
7
In the first stage, a trader can learn about the true value by incurring the cost c>0. The 
information acquisition decision of the buyer and the seller is denoted with nB,nS?{0,1} and 
is not observable by the other trader. In the second stage the traders play a double auction, 
i.e. the buyer proposes a bid price b and the seller proposes an ask price s simultaneously. If 
b?s, then the asset changes hand at the mean price p= 21 (b+s) and U
B=v+??p and 
US=p?(v??). Otherwise no trade occurs and the payoff is normalized to zero.  
A strategy of the buyer and the seller is denoted with B=(nB,b(?)) and S=(nS,s(?)),
respectively. If nB=1, then the buyer can submit state depend offers, i.e. b=(bL,bH) where bL
and bH denote the buyer’s offer in the state L and H, respectively. Analogously for the seller. 
An equilibrium in which trade occurs with probability one is called a full trade equilibrium. 
An equilibrium is called a k-sharing equilibrium if the buyer’s expected payoff is ??k and 
the seller’s expected payoff is ?+k. The solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
(BNE).
Remark 1
A set of no-trade equilibria is given by B=(0,b) and S=(0,s) with b?vL?? and s?vH+?. These 
equilibria always exist. 
7 A low valuation (v??)-trader may have low liquidity (that is a need for cash), hedging reasons to sell, or a 
relative tax disadvantage. The total trading surplus is therefore 2?. Assumption 1 makes the problem 
interesting and is assumed to hold throughout the paper. If ? is large,  the potential lemons problem has no 
adverse allocative consequences which will become clear in the analysis. 
53.  Information Acquisition in a Small Double Auction 
The socially efficient outcome is trade without costly information acquisition. The set of 
strategies leading to the set of acceptable prices p?[E[v]??,E[v]+?] for an uninformed 
buyer and uninformed seller is B=(0,b) and S=(0,s) with b=s=E[v]+k and k?[??, ?]. In the 
k-sharing outcome the buyer gets EUB=??k and the seller gets EUS=?+k. When do these 
strategies constitute best responses and an efficient equilibrium? 
Given the strategy S of the seller, suppose the buyer acquires information and 
speculates. In the low state he chooses a bid price bL<s and no trade occurs. In the high state 
he chooses bH=s and makes some speculative profits since he pays less than the true value of 
the asset. This response yields EUB= 21 [(vH+?)?(E[v]+k)]?c= 41 (vH?vL)+ 21 (??k)?c. So if 
4
1 (vH?vL)+ 21 (??k)?c>??k, then speculation is the best response, and the seller suffers an 
endogenous lemons problem since EUS= 21 (?+k)? 41 (vH?vL)<0. Analogously, if 41 (vH?vL)+
2
1 (?+k)?c>?+k, then the seller’s best response to B=(0,b) with b=E[v]+k is to choose 
S=(1,sL,sH) with sL=b and sH>b. Therefore, if c<max{?? 21 (??k),?? 21 (?+k)}=?? 21 (???k?)
where ?? 41 (vH?vL), then no efficient k-sharing BNE exists.
8
The economic intuition for this condition is simple. ? is the expected speculative 
profit an informed trader makes and 21 (???k?) is the expected opportunity cost of speculation. 
In the k-sharing outcome EUB=??k and EUS=?+k. If the buyer acquires information and 
speculates, he does not trade in state L and ex ante he forgoes the surplus (??k) with 
probability 0.5. If the seller speculates, his opportunity cost of speculation is 21 (?+k). So if 
the information cost is smaller than the speculative profit net the opportunity cost of 
speculation, a trader has an incentive to speculate and trade at the price p=E[v]+k is not an 
equilibrium outcome.  
Proposition 1 
If ?<c< 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, then no pure strategy BNE with trade exists. 
8 If c? 4
1 (vH?vL), then any k-sharing outcome is attainable as a BNE. As in the “standard” double auction, a 
continuum of trading equilibria exists. However, the set of efficient equilibria “shrinks” as the information cost 
decreases. If c= 4
1 (vH?vL)? 2
1 ?, then only the equal-split (k=0) outcome is attainable as an efficient 
equilibrium, i.e. the efficient BNE is unique.    
6In order to complete the proof of Proposition 1, it remains to show that a pure strategy 
trading BNE with one-sided or two-sided information acquisition also fails to exist. It is easy 
to see that if c>?, then no pure strategy equilibrium exists in which both traders acquire 
information. Suppose only the seller acquires information. This causes a lemons problem. 
Assumption 1 implies that vH??>E[v]??>vL+?. A standard lemons argument shows that the 
buyer offers at most vL+?. Trade only occurs in state L and the seller’s payoff is at most 
EUS=??c<0. (Analogously for the case nB=1 and nS=0.) In such a case, no trader acquires 
too expensive and non-exploitable information but in order to account for the endogenous 
lemons problem the buyer proposes b?vL+? and the seller proposes s?vH??. Therefore, no 
pure strategy BNE with trade exists. 
This inefficiency result is different from  Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) since the 
gain from trade is common knowledge. It is also different from Akerlof (1970) and Gresik 
(1991) since there is no asymmetric information about the common valuation in equilibrium. 
The reason is an endogenous lemons problem caused by the mere possibility of information 
acquisition. Dang (2006) shows that this no trade result under symmetric information also 
arises in ultimatum and alternating offer bargaining. The next proposition shows that a 
mixed strategy equilibrium is as inefficient as the no trade equilibrium.
Proposition 2 
Suppose that ?<c< 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?. The outcome in a (non-degenerated) mixed strategy BNE 
has the following properties. (i) Both traders get zero expected payoff. (ii) If trade occurs, 
the price is not fully revealing.
Proof: See Appendix. 
The following example highlights the intuition behind Proposition 2. Suppose that the 
traders are only allowed to choose three offer prices, namely b,s?{vL,E[v],vH}. The 
Appendix shows that in such a case in the unique (non-degenerated) mixed strategy 
equilibrium the buyer randomizes over the following three pure strategies: (0,vL), (0,E[v]) 
and (1,vL,E[v]). The seller randomizes over the strategies (0,vH), (0,E[v]) and (1,E[v],vH).
Trade only occurs at the following events. (i) Both traders do not acquire information and 
choose E[v]. (ii) The seller is uninformed and chooses s=E[v] and the buyer is informed and 
the true state is H. (iii) The buyer is uninformed and chooses b=E[v] and the seller is 
7informed and the true state is L. In particular, no trade occurs if both traders are informed. 
The probability of trade is ²4)²v(v c²16LH ???  and the price is p=E[v] and not fully revealing.
 Some further comments might be at place. (a) Why is the price not fully revealing? 
Suppose the seller does not acquire information and observes trade at p=E[v]. In this case he 
does not know whether the buyer chooses (0,E[v]) or (1,vL,E[v]). Although his posterior 
belief for v=vH increases, it is strictly below one. Otherwise he would know for sure that he 
has made a bad deal and this cannot be an equilibrium outcome.  
(b) In the mixed strategy equilibrium an uninformed trader proposes the offer price 
E[v] with positive probability, i.e. his behavior exhibits endogenous noise trading. In other 
words, an uninformed trader proposes an offer which is prone to speculation and he may 
suffer a speculative loss. However, his equilibrium payoff is non-negative since he meets an 
uninformed trader with positive probability. In such a case he realizes the trading gain 
without suffering a speculative loss.
(c) Why is there no trade if both traders are informed? Equivalently, why does an 
informed buyer choose b=E[v] in state H with probability 1 rather than randomizing over 
b=E[v] and b=vH, i.e. why does he choose (1,vL,vH) with probability zero? If he chooses 
b=vH in state H, then trade also occurs in the event where the seller is informed since an 
informed seller choose s=vH in state H. The “problem” is that if the buyer is indifferent 
between the strategies (1,vL,E[v]) and (1,vL,vH), then both strategies with information 
acquisition is strictly dominated by the strategy (0,vL). If the informed buyer trades at the 
price vH in state H, then his expected payoff net information cost is negative. So not 
acquiring information would be a best response. In other words, if a trader acquires 
information in a mixed strategy equilibrium, then he speculates since an informed trader 
expects to meet an endogenous noise trader with positive probability. 
(d) Why is the equilibrium payoff non-positive? Put it differently, since the minimum 
price the seller demands is s=E[v], why does the buyer choose (0,vL) with positive 
probability? The “problem” with a mixed strategy equilibrium is that the buyer has to 
randomize such that the seller is indifferent between information acquisition and no 
information acquisition. If the buyer only randomizes over the strategies (0,E[v]) and 
(1,vL,E[v]), some probability is “left” and this has to be put on the strategy (0,vL) although 
EUB(0,vL)=0. Since the buyer chooses (0,vL) with positive probability, the (overall) expected 
payoff of the buyer is zero. Therefore, the mixed strategy equilibrium is as inefficient as the 
no trade equilibrium. (This result also holds if the set of offer prices is continuous.) 
8(e) The difference vH?vL captures the importance of the endogenous lemons problem. 
As this difference and the endogenous lemons problem increases, this exerts two effects. (i) 
The information cost range which implies no pure strategy trading equilibrium increases, i.e. 
even for high information cost no efficient BNE exists. (ii) The equilibrium probability of 
trade ²4)²v(v c²16LH ???  decreases because the probability that an uninformed trader chooses the 
offer price E[v] decreases. 
Proposition 3 
If c????k? where k?[??, ?], then a full trade k-sharing BNE exists. In any such BNE both 
traders acquire information, the price is fully revealing, EUB=??k?c and EUS=?+k?c.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 3 shows that if the information cost is low, the traders face an information 
acquisition dilemma but trade occurs with probability one and the price is fully revealing.9
The intuition is simple. The desire of the liquidity traders to trade without being exploited 
induces information acquisition. There is no inverse relation between informationally 
efficient prices and the compensation for information cost since the trading surplus is fixed 
and larger than the information cost.10
This result can be interpreted as an endogenous justification of the symmetric 
information assumption of the over-the-counter-trading model in Duffie et al. (2005). If the 
information cost is low, both traders acquire information and have symmetric information 
before they meet and  bargain over the trading surplus. If the cost is high, no trader acquires 
information and they also have symmetric information.  
9 If c=?, then B=S=(1, vL+?, vH??) is the unique pure strategy BNE in which trade occurs with probability 
one. There also exist equilibria in which one trader acquires information and trade occurs with probability 0.5. 
From a social point of view, a full trade BNE dominates a partial trade BNE if c<?.
10 Jackson (1991) shows that with imperfect competition fully revealing prices exist despite costly information. 
In his model there are three players (an informed rational traders, an uninformed rational trader, and a noise 
trader) and the motive for information acquisition is to exploit the noise trader. In contrast, Proposition 3 shows 
that the traders acquire information to avoid being exploited if the information cost is low.  
94.  Information Acquisition in Large Double Auctions 
This section extends the two trader case to a setting with 2N traders. All assumptions of the 
basic model in section 2 hold. In addition, the following assumptions are made.  
Assumptions and Notations 
(1) There are N traders who each has a valuation v+? for the first unit and a valuation v for 
the other units. There are N traders who each has a valuation v?? for the first unit and a 
valuation v for the other units. These traders possess one unit of the asset each.11
(2) A trader is allowed to buy and sell m units. Short selling is allowed. A strategy of a buyer 
i and seller i consists of three components and is denoted with Bi=(nBi,bi(?),uBi(?)) and 
Si=(nSi,si(?),uSi(?)), respectively, where ui denotes the units of the asset a trader wants to trade. 
An informed trader can submit state-contingent orders, i.e. ui=(uiL,uiH).
(3) The price is set to equalized total demand and total supply. If there is excess demand 
(supply), then the buyers (sellers) with the highest bid prices (lowest ask price) are served 
first. The remaining units are allocated to the traders who propose the same offer with equal 
probability.12
A motivation for Assumption (1) is the following. Suppose the traders are funds managers 
who follow different trading styles, have opposite trading needs, and want to rebalance their 
portfolio by trading one unit of the asset with each other. A buyer is willing to pay (up to ?)
more than the value v, while a seller is willing to accept less than v. Having rebalanced their 
positions and met their liquidity needs they are not willing to pay more or less than the value 
v. The assumption is employed to replicate the traders’ valuations in Reny and Perry (2006). 
Since short-selling is allowed, there is no build-in asymmetry between buyers and sellers. If 
short-selling is not allowed, all following results also hold qualitatively. (See footnote 15.)
Corollary
Suppose there are N traders where a trader is allowed to buy and sell m=1 unit each and 
?<c< 21 (vH?vL)? 21 ?. (i) No pure strategy BNE with trade exists. (ii) A mixed strategy BNE 
is inefficient and the price is not fully revealing. 
11 To simplify the wording, a low (high) valuation trader is called seller (buyer). 
12 This allocation rule is adopted from Reny and Perry (2006). See their section 4.1 for a detailed description.  
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Part (i) of the Corollary follows almost directly from Proposition 1. Suppose p=E[v]. This 
price is less prone to speculation because the opportunity cost of speculation is highest for 
both the buyers and sellers. Since there are additional buyers and sellers, an informed trader 
can potentially make more profit in a large market although he can only buy or sell one unit. 
For example, an informed seller becomes a speculator in state L and buys one unit of the 
asset which is not possible in a small (N=1) double auction. In state H, as in a small double 
auction, he sells one unit of the asset. Therefore, his expected payoff with information 
acquisition is 21 (vH?vL)+ 21 ??c. If c< 21 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, this strategy dominates trade at p=E[v] 
with expected payoff ?, and no pure strategy trading BNE without information acquisition 
exists. In a pure strategy BNE with trade, at least one buyer and one seller acquire 
information. Since c>?, a pair of informed traders cannot jointly cover their information cost 
by trading one unit each. No pure strategy trading BNE with information acquisition exists. 
Part (ii) follows from Proposition 2. The price is not fully revealing. If p=v??, then 
either the informed buyer or the informed seller has a negative payoff since c>?. In a mixed 
strategy BNE there is a positive probability that some uninformed traders do not trade. Since 
a fraction of liquidity traders does not trade, the equilibrium is inefficient.   
This Corollary provides the simplest example which shows that an efficient and fully 
revealing BNE in a large double auction market may fail to exist if information is 
endogenous and costly. Similar to Reny and Perry (2006), this example also assumes that a 
trader is only allowed to trade one unit.
This Corollary shows that having a common market place may not be able to resolve 
the inefficiency that arises in the small double auction. In contrast, the next proposition 
shows that a large double auction market where a trader can trade m>1 units may perform 
worse. In the small (N=1) double auction, if the information cost is large, i.e. 
c? 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, then an efficient equilibrium exists. If the number of traders increases, an 
efficient equilibrium fails to exist although the information cost is very large. 
Proposition 4 
Suppose the number N of traders is large and c< 21 m(vH?vL)? 21 ?. There exists no pure 
strategy trading BNE without information acquisition.  
Proof
The proof for m=1 follows directly from the previous analysis, but the proof for m>1 is 
based on three arguments. (a) If a pure strategy trading BNE without information acquisition 
11
exists, then N units are traded, i.e. all traders are “satisfied”. (b) If a pure strategy trading 
BNE without information acquisition exists, then trade is executed at the price p=E[v]. (c) 
No pure strategy trading BNE without information acquisition exists where trade is executed 
at the price p=E[v].
The following arguments prove claim (a). Suppose all traders do not acquire 
information, and each low-valuation trader (buyer) submits an order to buy one unit and each 
high-valuation trader (seller) submits an order to sell one unit and their offer prices are 
summarized by the offer price profile B=(b1,….bN) and S=(s1,….sN). Given (B,S), suppose 
the resulting market (clearing) price is p?(E[v]??,E[v]+?). Suppose bi<p and buyer i does 
not get the asset. Given (B,S), buyer i can do better by choosing bi?p and gets one unit with 
positive probability and EU>0. Any buyer or seller who does not get to buy or sell one unit 
of the asset at the resulting price, has not played a best response. (If p=E[v]??, “unsatisfied” 
buyers will deviate. If p=E[v]+?, “unsatisfied” sellers will deviate.) This reasoning implies 
that if a trading equilibrium without information acquisition exists, then all traders are 
“satisfied”, i.e. N units are traded. Therefore, a candidate offer profile (B,S)  for being part of
a pure strategy BNE must have bi?p and si?p (i=1,….N) where p is the resulting market 
price given (B,S).
The proof of claim (b) is as follows. Suppose each trader trades one unit and the offer 
profile (B,S) gives rise to the price p?[E[v]??,E[v]+?]. Case (i) Suppose p<E[v]. Consider 
buyer i who chooses bi and gets one unit of the asset. For example, a profitable deviation is 
to choose the same offer price but submits an order of m units. The expected payoff is 
EU=(E[v]+??p)+prob(trade)(m?1)(E[v]?p)>?. Therefore, if p<E[v], then a buyer who gets 
one unit has not played a best response. In some sense there is incentive to buy more and 
overbid the other buyers. (ii) If p>E[v], then a seller who sells one unit has not played a best 
response. There is incentive to sell short and underbid the other sellers. Consequently, only if 
p=E[v], then an uninformed trader who trades one unit has no profitable deviation.     
The proof of claim (c) is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that no trader 
acquires information and the offer profile (B,S) yields the market price p=E[v] and all traders 
trade one unit each. Then some traders have a profitable deviation. For example, buyer i 
acquires information.  In state H, he chooses bi=E[v]+?b to buy m units where ?b is chosen 
such that bi is larger than the m-th highest bid prices given B=(b1,..,bN). The (additional) 
demand of buyer i may increase the market clearing price from p=E[v] to at most p=E[v]+?b.
Suppose p=E[v]+?b. His payoff in this state is (vH+?)+(m?1)vH?mp?c= 21 m(vH?vL?2?b)
12
+??c.13 In state L he forgoes the surplus ? and chooses bi=E[v]??s to sell short m units 
where ?s is chosen such that bi is smaller than the m-th lowest ask prices given S=(s1,..,sN).
Suppose p=E[v]??s. His payoff in this state is 21 m(vH?vL?2?s)?c.
If the number N of traders is large, then the price impact is zero in the following 
sense. For a given offer profile (B,S) and the market clearing price p=E[v], there always 
exists the same market clearing price such that buyer i buys or sells m units.14  Therefore, the 
expected payoff of buyer i with information acquisition is BiEU = 21 m(vH?vL)+ 21 ??c.
Speculation is the best response if 21 m(vH?vL)+ 21 ??c>?. Analogously for a seller. 
Consequently, if c< 21 m(vH?vL)? 21 ?, there exists no pure strategy trading equilibrium 
without information acquisition.15 QED
Proposition 5 
Suppose the number N of traders is large and c< 21 m(vH?vL)? 21 ?. The outcome in a BNE 
with trade has the following properties (i) A strictly positive fraction of liquidity traders does 
not trade. (ii) The price is not fully revealing. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
A notion of a competitive or close to competitive market is that a trader can trade as many 
units of the asset as he likes without having much price impact. Proposition 5 can be 
interpreted as saying that such a  large double auction market may be both allocatively and 
informationally inefficient. These inefficiencies do not disappear when the number of traders 
increases but arise even though the information cost is very large. Therefore, an efficient and 
fully revealing equilibrium in the Reny and Perry (2006) type large double auction market 
may fail to exist if information is endogenous and costly. On the other hand, the next 
Proposition shows that if c=0, then this model generates an equilibrium which is consistent 
with Reny and Perry (2006) result.
13 The buyer’s valuation for the first unit is v+? and v for the other units.  
14 Consider the two extreme cases. (i) All sellers choose E[v]?? and all buyers choose E[v]+? and the price is 
E[v]. If the true value is high, an informed buyer chooses E[v]+?+? and buys m units. For m<N, there exists a 
market clearing price p=E[v]. (ii) All b=s=E[v]. If the buyer chooses E[v]+?+?, a market price p=E[v] exists. 





If c=0, then there exists a BNE with the following properties. (i) All traders acquire 
information and trade one unit each. (ii) If m=1, the equilibrium price is p?[v??,v+?]. (iii) 
If m>1, then the equilibrium price is p=v.  
It is easy to see that (a) for m=1, Bi=Si=(1,(vL+k,vH+k),(1,1)) where k?[??,?] and i=1,..,N 
constitute a BNE where p=v+k and EUB=??k and EUS=?+k. (b) For m>1, Bi=Si=(1,(vL,vH),
(1,1)) constitute the unique pure strategy trading BNE and EUB=EUS=?. Note if p?v, then a 
trader may want to trade more units. There is overbidding and underbidding which can not 
be an equilibrium. (See the proof of Claim B in Proposition 4.). In both cases an efficient and 
fully revealing BNE exists.16
5.  Discussion 
(a) This paper assumes that the signal a trader acquires is perfect. Under the assumption of 
risk neutrality this assumption is not crucial. If the signal is noisy, it only changes the 
expected potential speculative profit and the critical value of the information cost but not the 
qualitative implications.17 The results also hold if the signals are noisy and only a few traders 
are risk neutral. Then the risk neutral traders (such as hedge funds) are willing to take large 
position and exert a speculative threat that “destroys” the efficient equilibrium. This paper 
implies that as the market size N increases, the risk neutral traders have the highest incentive 
to acquire information and exert a speculative threat although the information cost is high.    
(b) This paper assumes that the value v of the asset is a binary random variable. If v 
is a continuous random variable and the information of the traders is represented as a 
partition, then the qualitative results hold. Other versions of modeling information give rise 
to technical difficulties. See footnote 17. 
(c) This paper assumes a minimum heterogeneity between traders. Each buyer and 
each seller just has a trading need of one unit. Each seller possesses one unit of the asset. 
16 Since all traders receive the same signal, this model is not able to discuss the aggregation of diverse 
information. However, for the case c=0, Reny and Perry (2006) have established an important result. 
17 Consider the following two versions of a noisy signal. (a) With probability q the trader learns the true value 
and with probability 1?q he learns the wrong value. If the traders receive perfectly correlated signals, all results 
go through smoothly.  (b) If trader i receives the signal zi=v+?i where ? i is a zero mean random variable, then 
this gives rise to some technical difficulties in calculating expected payoff conditional on trade and therefore 
the equilibrium offer strategies.  
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Modifying the assumption by assuming different endowments and a more complicated 
individual demand and supply schedule is equivalent to assuming small and large liquidity 
traders, i.e. heterogeneous ?i. This would only change the critical information cost ranges.  
(d) The analysis is based on the assumption that information acquisition is not 
observable. The next proposition shows that if information acquisition is observable by the 
other traders in the auction stage, then endogenous information acquisition has no adverse 
allocative consequences.
Proposition 7 
Suppose N=1, information acquisition is observable and k?[??, ?]. Any efficient k-sharing 
outcome is attainable as a perfect BNE irrespective of information cost. 
The intuition is as follows.18 Since information acquisition is observable, a trader can also 
condition his offer strategy on the fact whether the other party is better informed or not. 
Suppose ex ante the traders “agree” to trade at p=E[v], but the buyer acquires information. In 
the auction stage the seller knows that the buyer is informed. So the seller does not submit 
the offer s=E[v] anymore but a high offer. Since the buyer anticipates the lemons problem he 
himself creates by acquiring information, his best response is not to acquire information. No 
trader has an incentive to acquire more information than the counter party. However, if 
information acquisition is not observable, the traders cannot target their offer strategies 
appropriately and are concerned about the endogenous lemons problem.19
6.  Conclusion 
This paper analyses information acquisition in a financial market setting where all liquidity 
traders behave strategically and shows that an efficient and fully revealing equilibrium in the 
Reny and Perry (2006) type double auction market may fail to exist if information is 
endogenous and costly. For a given number of traders there exists a range for the information 
18 Formally, it is to show and easy to see that for k?[??,?], r?k, and t?k, the strategies B=(0,b) with b=E[v]+k 
if nS=0, and b=vL+r if nS=1; and S=(0,s) with s=E[v]+k if nB=0, and s=vH+t if nB=1 constitute a perfect BNE 
with EUB=??k and EUS=?+k. Analogously, one can show that for the N>1, an efficient equilibrium exists in 
which no trader acquires information, and all traders chooses E[v] in the auction stage if no trader has acquired 
information.  
19 Proposition 7 is similar in flavor to Perry and Reny (2002) who show that two-stage bidding can achieve 
efficiency in common values auctions with (exogenous) private information. See also Mezzetti (2004). 
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cost such that only mixed strategy trading equilibria exist. The more traders and the more 
units a trader can trade, the larger this range with inefficient equilibria.  
In a mixed strategy equilibrium the uninformed strategic liquidity traders exhibits 
endogenous noise trading in the sense that they propose offers that are prone to speculation 
and suffer a speculative loss with positive probability. Therefore, this paper provides a 
strategic foundation for both the noise trading assumption in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
and their impossibility result of informationally efficient prices.  
In addition, this paper shows that a centralized market may perform worse than 
bilateral trading and identifies a potential benefit of over-the-counter markets.20 In 
decentralized trading, if the information cost is large, then no socially wasteful information 
is acquired and trade occurs in equilibrium. In centralized trading, if the information cost is 
large, then information is acquired and some liquidity traders do not trade in equilibrium.   
However, this paper ignores the potential cost of finding a trader with the opposite 
trading need. An important function of a large market may be the bundling of liquidity. In 
addition, this paper analyzes a one-period trading game and highlights a potential 
inefficiency in a static large double auction. A second important function of a centralized 
market is the transmission of information through prices and sequential trading. If the traders 
are heterogeneous in liquidity and urgency, i.e. they have different trading needs or different 
discounting of their trading gains, then it is likely that the large liquidity traders with a 
continuous inflow of trading needs (such as the execution of incoming orders of costumers) 
are the ones who acquire information and determine prices. The small and more patient 
traders wait, observe the price and trade without costly information acquisition. Further 
research may provide additional insights on the working of different trading institutions 
when the information of the traders is endogenous. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The set of mixed strategies may be very large. A trader randomizes over two actions. First, 
he randomizes over the information acquisition decision. Then he randomizes over choosing 
offer prices. The proof contains two parts and proceeds as follows. Part A derives a mixed 
20 Common stocks are traded in centralized markets with high transparency (opened order book) and relatively 
high daily trading volume, while other financial instruments are traded in decentralized dealership markets with 
low transparency and relatively low daily trading volume. For example, the trading of corporate bonds, 
derivatives, and mortgage-back securities in over-the-counter markets are  said to be opaque. 
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strategy BNE under the assumption that the traders can only choose three offer prices. Part B 
shows that the equilibrium properties in part A also hold without this restriction.  
Part A
Assumption A
The traders can only choose offer prices from the set b,s?{vL,E[v],vH}.21
Remark A1
From the discussion in Section 3, an informed buyer does not choose b>vL+? at vL while an 
informed seller does not choose s<vH?? at vH. An uninformed buyer (seller) does not choose 
b>E[v]+? (s<E[v]??). These actions are dominated choices.22
Step 1
(a) Given Assumption A and Remark A1, one can focus on the following mixed strategies. 
The buyer chooses nB=1 with probability ?1, and nB=0 with probability 1??1. An 
uninformed buyer chooses b=vL with probability ?2, and b=E[v] with probability 1??2. An 
informed buyer chooses b=vL at v=vL; and at v=vH he chooses b=E[v] with probability ?3,
and b=vH with probability 1??3.23 The seller chooses nS=1 with probability ?1, and nB=0
with probability 1??1. An uninformed seller chooses s=E[v] with probability ?2; and s=vH
with probability 1??2. An informed seller chooses s=vH at v=vH; and at v=vL he chooses 
s=E[v] with probability ?3, and s=vL with probability 1??3. (See Figure 1.)
In other words, the buyer considers a randomization over the following pure 
strategies: He chooses the strategy (0,vL) with probability ?B1=(1??1)(1??2), the strategy 
(0,E[v]) with probability ?B2=(1??1)?2, (1,vL,E[v]) with ?B3=?1?3, and (1,vL,vH) with 
?B4=?1(1??3). The seller considers a randomization over the following pure strategies: He 
chooses (0,vH), (0,E[v]), (1,E[v],vH) and (1,vL,vH) with the probabilities ?S1=(1??1)(1??2),
?S2=(1??1)?2, ?S3=?1?3, and ?S4=?1(1??3), respectively. 
21 If ? is small, then the discrete offer set is a good approximation.  
22 Suppose the buyer chooses (0, vH??). His expected payoff is negative although the seller is “honest” and 
“generous” in the sense that he chooses (0, E[v]??) or (1, vL+?,vH??).
23 The informed buyer may also choose b=vL in the state H. However, there is never trade since an informed 




?1      1??1
       nB=1 nB=0
    

















b     b=E[v] b=vL
Seller
?1 1??1
       nS=1 nS=0
    

















s     s=E[v] s=vH
(b) The expected payoffs of the buyer are given as follows. 
EUB(0,vL)  = 21 ?1(1??3)?
EUB(0,E[v])             = 21 [?1(1??3)(vL+?? 21 (E[v]+vL))+?1?3(vL+??E[v])+
   (1??1)?2(vL+??E[v])] + 21 (1??1)?2(vH+??E[v])
= 21 ?1(1??3)(?? 41 (vH?vL))+ 21 ?1?3(?? 21 (vH?vL))+(1??1)?2?
EUB(1,vL, E[v]) = 21 ?1(1??3)?+ 21 (1??1)?2(vH+??E[v])?c
= 21 ?1(1??3)?+ 21 (1??1)?2(?+ 21 (vH?vL))?c
EUB(1,vL,vH)  = 21 ?1(1??3)?+ 21 [?1?+(1??1)(1??2)?+(1??1)?2(vH+?? 21 (vH+E[v])]?c
= 21 ?1(1??3)?+ 21 ?1?+ 21 (1??1)(1??2)?+ 21 (1??1)?2(?+ 41 (vH?vL))?c
To save on notation, the subsequent analysis is done in terms of ?B and ?S. The expected 
payoffs of the buyer are given as follows.
EUB(0,vL)  = 21 ?S4?
EUB(0,E[v])    = 21 ?S4(?? 41 (vH?vL))+ 21 ?S3(?? 21 (vH?vL))+?S2?
EUB(1,vL,E[v]) = 21 ?S4?+ 21 ?S2(?+ 21 (vH?vL))?c
EUB(1,vL,vH)  = 21 ?S4?+ 21 (?S3+?S4)?+ 21 ?S1?+ 21 ?S2(?+ 41 (vH?vL))?c
(c) The expected payoffs of the seller are given as follows.24
EUS(0,vH)  = 21 ?B4?
EUS(0,E[v])  = 21 ?B4(?? 41 (vH?vL))+ 21 ?B3(?? 21 (vH?vL))+?B2?
24 Suppose the seller chooses (1,E[v],vH). His payoff is ?B2(E[v]?(vL??)) if the state is L, and ?B4? if the state 
is H. Analogously for the other strategies. 
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EUS(1, E[v],vH) = 21 ?B4?+ 21 ?B2(?+ 21 (vH?vL))?c
EUS(1,vL,vH)  = 21 ?B4?+ 21 (?B3+?B4)?+ 21 ?B1?+ 21 ?B2(?+ 41 (vH?vL))?c
Step 2
(a) This step analyses the best responses of the buyer. 
(i) The strategy (1,vL,E[v]) weakly dominates (1,vL,vH) if EUB(1,vL,E[v]) ? EUB(1,vL,vH)
? 21 ?S2(?+ 21 (vH?vL))?c ? 21 (?S3+?S4)?+ 21 ?S1?+ 21 ?S2(?+ 41 (vH?vL))?c
? 81 ?S2(vH?vL)) ? 21 (?S1+?S3+?S4)?










































































(b) Analogously for the seller. E.g., if E[v]),(v )v,(vB2 L HLI? ? ,then EU
S(1,E[v],vH) ? EUS(1,vL,vH).
Step 3
Claim: There exists no mixed strategy equilibrium in which the buyer and the seller choose 
the strategy (1,vLvH) with positive probability. 
Proof: For the buyer, (1,vL,vH) and (1,vL,E[v]) are the two potential strategies with 
information acquisition for being a candidate in a mixed strategy equilibrium. The buyer 
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does not choose (1,vL,vH) with positive probability if it is strictly dominated by (1,vL,E[v]).
Suppose that the strategy (1,vL,vH) weakly dominates (1,vL,E[v]), i.e. E[v]),(v )v,(vS2 L HLI? ? . It is 





I . Consequently, if the strategy (1,vL,vH) weakly dominates 





I? ? .25 Therefore, if the seller randomizes such that the buyer is indifferent between 
(1,vL,vH) and (1,vL,E[v]); or (1,vL,vH) dominates (1,vL,E[v]), then the buyer chooses ?B1=1,
i.e. he does not acquire information. Analogously for the seller, if the strategy (1,vL,vH)
weakly dominates (1,E[v],vH), then (1,vL,vH) is strictly dominated by the strategy (0,vH).
Consequently, in a mixed strategy equilibrium (where information must be acquired 
with positive probability), the strategy (1,vL,vH) must be a strictly dominated strategy and 
one must have ?B4=?S4=0 (or ?3=?3=1).26
Step 4
Claim: In a mixed strategy equilibrium the traders get zero expected payoff.  
Proof: For ?B4=?S4=0, EUB(0,vL)=EUS(0,vH)=0. In other words, if the buyer is indifferent 
between (1,vL,E[v]) and (0,vL) or indifferent between (0,E[v]) and (0,vL), then his expected 
payoff is zero. In order to find a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the traders get positive 
expected payoffs, the following is required: For the buyer, he should be indifferent between 
(1,vL,E[v]) and (0,E[v]); and (0,E[v]) should strictly dominate (0,vL), i.e. the buyer chooses 










25 The intuition is that the buyer does not get enough compensation for the information cost if he is “honest”, 
i.e. when trade occurs at p=vH in the state H. Therefore, not acquiring information is a best response. If the 






I? ?  and c>? imply E[v]),(vvS2 LLI? ? . If the buyer is indifferent between (1,vL,E[v]) 





I? ?  implies E[v]),(v )v,(vS2 L HLI? ? .
26 Suppose the buyer just randomizes over (0,vL) and (0,E[v]). If the seller also does not acquire information, 
then he chooses s=E[v] with probability 1. Given the seller’s response, the buyer’s best response is (1,vL,E[v]). 
So there exists no mixed strategy equilibrium in which information is acquired with zero probability. 
27 For the seller, he should be indifferent between (1,E[v],vH) and (0,E[v]); and (0,E[v]) should strictly 








Since c< 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, this implies that 1?2vv 4cLH ??? . Therefore ?S2+?S3<1, which means 
that there is some probability “left”, i.e. ?S1 must be larger than zero. In order to make the 
buyer indifferent between (1,vL,E[v]) and (0,E[v]), the seller must choose (0,vH) with 
positive probability.
On the other hand, if the seller chooses (0,vH) with positive probability he must be 
indifferent between (0,E[v]) and (0,vH). Since EUS(0,vH)=0, EUS(0,E[v]) must be zero, too. 
Otherwise, the seller is not indifferent. Consequently, the expected payoff of the seller must 
be zero in a mixed strategy equilibrium.28
Step 5
Claim: In the unique (non-degenerated) mixed strategy equilibrium the buyer randomizes 
over (0,vL), (0,E[v]) and (1,vL,E[v]) according to ?B and the seller randomizes over (0,vH),
















In order to make the buyer indifferent between (1,vL,E[v]) and (0,vL), the seller chooses ?S2
such that E[v]),(vvS2 LLI? ? ; and to make the buyer indifferent between (1,vL,E[v]) and (0,E[v]), 



























28 Analogously for the buyer, he must choose (0,vL) with positive probability in order to make the seller 
indifferent between (1,E[v],vH) and (0,E[v]), i.e. his expected payoff is zero in a mixed strategy equilibrium. 
29 Equivalently, the traders choose ²4?)²v(v
16c?
11 LH




LH?? , and 
1?? 33 ?? .  Note, ?B3=?1?3 and ?B2=(1??1)?2.








?? ???  and yields the same condition. 












Claim: The outcome in a mixed strategy BNE has the following properties. (i) The 
probability of trade is ²4)²v(v c²16LH ??? . (ii) The only trading price is E[v] and not fully revealing. 
Proof :
The buyer randomizes over (0,vL), (0, E[v]) and (1,vL, E[v]). 
The seller randomizes over (0,vH), (0, E[v]) and (1, E[v], vH).
(i) Trade occurs in the following events: (a) both the buyer and the seller actually choose 
(0,E[v]); (b) the buyer chooses (0,E[v]) and the seller chooses (1,E[v],vH) and the true state 
is L; and (c) the buyer chooses (1,vL,E[v]), the seller chooses (0,E[v]) and the true state is H. 





















(ii) The buyer bids at most E[v] and the seller demands at least E[v]. Therefore, no trade 
occurs at the price vL and vH. Trade only occurs if at least one trader is uninformed. If the 
uninformed trader observes trade, he cannot distinguish whether he makes a fair deal and 
realizes ?, or suffers a speculative loss. Although the uninformed trader updates his belief, 
he does not know the true state when observing p=E[v].
Remark A2
?i3 is the equilibrium probability of information acquisition. (See also footnote 29.) It 
decreases in vH?vL and increases in the information cost c which seems unintuitive. As the 
potential speculative profit increases and the cost of becoming informed decreases, one 
might expect that a trader has a higher incentive to acquire information. But in order to make 
the other trader indifferent between pure strategies, equilibrium randomization requires it. 
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Remark A3
If c= 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, then in the non-degenerated mixed strategy BNE the buyer randomizes 
over (0,E[v]) and (1,vL,E[v]) according to ?B and the seller randomizes over (0,E[v]) and 















SB  , 
and trade occurs with probability ?i1, and both traders have zero expected payoff.32
Remark A4
(a) For c= 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, as (vH?vL)? ?, then c ? ? and the probability that both traders 
choose (0,E[v]) converges to one and yet EUB=EUS=0.
(b) For c< 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?, as (vH?vL)? ?, then the probability that the buyer chooses (0,vL)
and the seller chooses (0,vH) converges to one. 
Part B 
Now it is assumed that the traders can choose any real number as an offer price. The buyer 
(and seller) randomizes over pure offer strategies by choosing a distribution with positive 
density f (and g) over the real line. Assumption 1 and Remark A1 imply that in search for a 
candidate for an equilibrium offer randomization with positive payoffs, it suffices to focus 























where fL,fM,fH?0. In particular, H0f =0 (
L
0g =0) if the buyer (seller) does not acquire 
information. If the buyer acquires information and v=vL, then ML1,f =
H
L1,f =0. If the seller 
acquires information and v=vH, then LH1,g =
M
H1,g =0. (See Figures 2 and 3). 
Figure 2 
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L ?)vb?prob(v)Iprob(b(b)dbf  which is “equivalent” to ?3.
Analogously for the other cases. The extension of the strategy where an uninformed buyer 
plays b=vL with probability ?2, b=E[v] with probability 1??2 and b=vH with probability zero 
is choosing f with L0f ,
M
0f >0 and 
H
0f =0, i.e. the uninformed buyer only chooses a positive 
density over the interval IL and IM.
So if the seller actually chooses nS=0 and s=vH as the randomization outcome, then  
























































which is analogous to EUS(0,vH)= 21 ?1(1??3)?= 21 ?B4?.
From Step 3, a similar argument will show that in no mixed strategy equilibrium does an 
informed buyer choose a positive density over [vH??, vH+?] , i.e. HH1,f =0. If he is indifferent 
between (1,bL’,bH’) and (1,bL’’,bH’’) where bL‘,bL‘’?IL, bH’?IM and bH’’?IH, then (0,b) with 
b?IL strictly dominates the both strategies. Therefore EUS(0,vH)=0.
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From Step 4, in order to make the buyer indifferent between nB=0 and nB=1, the seller must 





0 0(s)dsg . Therefore, the equilibrium payoff of the seller is zero.  
Claim 2:  If trade occurs, then the price is p?(E[v]??,E[v]+?) and not fully revealing. 
Proof:  Remark A1 shows that an informed buyer chooses HL1,f =
H
H1,f =0 and an informed 
seller chooses LL1,g =
L
H1,g =0. For the buyer, instead of randomizing over (1,vL, E[v]), (0,vL)
and (0, E[v]), he randomizes over information acquisition and then chooses a density fL and 
fM. Instead of randomizing over (1, E[v], vH), (0,vH) and (0, E[v]), the seller randomizes over 
information acquisition and then chooses a density gM and gH. The previous steps show that 
trade can only occur if the buyer actually chooses b?IM  and the seller actually chooses s?IM
and b?s. In any case p?IM . QED
Proof of Proposition 3
Claim A: Suppose r,t?[??, ?]. If c? 21 (?+min{r,?t}), then B
*=S*=(1, vL+r, vH+t) are 
best responses and EUB=?? 21 (r+t)?c and EU
S=?+ 21 (r+t)?c.
Proof: Given S*, if the buyer chooses B*, then EUB= 21 [vL+??(vL+r)]+ 21 [vH+? ?
(vH+t)]?c=?? 21 (r+t)?c?0 since ?? 21 (r+t)? 21 (?+min{r,?t})?c. If the buyer chooses (0,b) 
with b=vH+t then EUB= 21 [vL+?? 21 (vL+r+vH+t)]+ 21 [vH+??(vH+t)]=?? 41 (vH?vL)? 41 (r+3t).
For r=t=??, the buyers’ payoff is maximal and yet EUB=? 41 (vH?vL)+2?<0 (Assumption 1). 
If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b=vL+r then EUB= 21 (??r). This response is weakly 
dominated by response B* since c? 21 (??t). So B
* is a best response to S*.33
Analogously for the seller, if he chooses (0,s) with s=vL+r then EUS=?+ 41 (3r+t)?
4
1 (vH?vL)<0. If the seller chooses (0,s) with s=vH+t then EUS= 21 (?+t)??+ 21 (r+t)?c since 
c? 21 (?+r). So S
* is a best response to B*. For c?min{ 21 (??t), 21 (?+r)}= 21 (?+min{r,?t}),
(B*,S*) constitutes a BNE equilibrium. 
Claim B:  If c????k? for k?[??,?], there exists a two-sided information acquisition 
and full trade equilibrium with the payoffs EUB=??k?c and EUS=?+k?c.
33 It is easy to see that B* also dominates the strategies (0,b) where b<sL, b?(sL,sH) or b>sH.
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Proof: For a fixed k?[??,?], define k= 21 (r+t) then r=2k?t and t=2k?r. From Claim 
A, the maximal allowable information cost ck for the payoffs EUB=?? 21 (r+t)?c and 
EUS=?+ 21 (r+t)?c being equilibrium payoffs is ck=0.5?(?+min{r,?t}). The maximum 












0.5?(?+min{2k?t, ?2k+r.}).    (*) 






0.5?(?+min{2k?t, ?2k+r.})= 0.5?(?+min{2k+?, ?2k+?})=0.5?(2??2?k?).     
For c=ck=???k?, one equilibrium strategies pair B=S=(1,vL+r, vH+t) leading to the payoffs 
EUB=??k?c and EUS=?+k?c is given as follows: If k?[??,0] then set r=?+2k and t=??. If 
k?[0,?] then set r=? and t=??+2k.
Claim C: If c????k?, no full trade equilibrium exists in which (i) no trader acquires 
information or (ii) only one trader acquires information.  
Proof: (i) Assumption 1 implies that ???k?< 41 (vH?vL)? 21 ?. So no efficient 
equilibrium exists. (ii) Suppose that only the buyer acquires information. He is willing to 
choose any (bL,bH) with bL=vL+r and bH=vH+t where r,t?[??, ?]. If there is to be full trade 
the seller must choose (0,s) with s=vL+r. For any r,t?[??, ?], EUS=?+ 41 (3r+t)? 41 (vH?vL)<0.
Analogously for nB=0 and nS=1. So no full trade occurs if only one trader acquires 
information. QED
Proof Proposition 5 (ii) 
Case (a): c<?.
Since c<?, all informed trader can cover their information cost by trading just one unit. 
Suppose the price is fully revealing and all traders realize their trading gains. (Otherwise 
some traders have a profitable deviation.) Then the only candidate price for an equilibrium 
price is p=v. If p<v (p>v), then both an informed and uninformed buyer (seller) has a 
profitable deviation by overbidding (underbidding) the other traders and buy (sell) m units 
instead of one unit. 
Suppose k buyers and r sellers acquire information and the traders choose the 
following strategies: Bi=(1,(vL,vH),(uBiL,uBiH)), Sj=(1,(vL,vH),(uSjL,uSjH)), Bm=(0,vH,uBm),
Sn=(0, vL,uSn) where i=1,..,k; j=1,..,r; m=k+1,..,N and n=r+1,..,N and trade occurs at p=v.  
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 (i) Suppose k=r=1. Consider the following strategies: B1=S1=(1,(vL,vH),(1,1)),
Bi=(0,vH,1), Si=(0,vL,1). The market clearing price is p=vL in state L and p=vH in state H and 
each trader trades one unit. The following arguments show that these strategies do not 
constitute a BNE. A profitable  deviation of Buyer 1 is B’=(1,(vL,vL+?),(1,m)). Suppose 
v=vH. If p=vH is the price, then (N?1) units are traded. The order of Buyer 1 is not executed. 
If p=vL is the price, then also (N?1) units are traded. Buyer 1 receives m units. (Seller 1 does 
not trade). So there is equal probability that trade is executed at one of these prices. It is easy 
to see that EU1B(B1’)>EU1B(B1). Analogously, the informed seller has the same incentive tp 
speculate.34
(ii) So for any given number (k,r)-informed traders, if an informed trader can move 
the price (with positive probability), then the informed trader speculates. If the price is fully 
revealing, the uninformed traders on the other side of the market know that they suffer a 
speculative loss. This cannot be an equilibrium outcome. 
(iii) Suppose that the number (k,r)-informed traders is such that an informed trader 
cannot influence the price. If the price is fully revealing, then e.g. an informed buyer 
deviates to Bi=((0,vH),1). He realizes his trading needs without paying the information cost.  
Consequently, there exists no pure strategy trading BNE as well as no BNE where the 
price is fully revealing. If trade occurs, then the price p?(E[v]??,E[v]+?).
Case (b): c>?.
Suppose the price is fully revealing. In a pure strategy BNE with trade, at least one buyer 
and one seller acquires information. Since c>?, this pair of informed traders cannot jointly 
cover their information cost by trading one unit each. At least one informed trader must trade 
more than one unit of the asset. This means that some uninformed traders do not realize their 
trading needs. Suppose the offer profiles (B,S) yields a fully revealing price p=v??. An 
argument similar to the one given in the proof of Proposition 4 will show that an uninformed 
trader who does trade has not played a best response. Given the profile (B,S), an 
“unsatisfied” buyer (seller) would choose a sufficiently high (low) offer price so as to get 
one unit for sure without being concern about the lemons problem since the price is fully 
revealing. So no pure strategy BNE with fully revealing prices exists. Case (a) shows that the 
price is not fully revealing in a mixed strategy BNE. 
34 The same arguments apply if the traders choose any offer v??.
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Proof Proposition 5 (i) 
Suppose the equilibrium is efficient. If a pure strategy BNE exists, then the price is fully 
revealing since there is no uncertainty about the offer of all traders in equilibrium. (In a pure 
strategy BNE an uninformed trader can infer the information of other traders from observing 
the price.) The proof of part 5 (ii) implies that the equilibrium price is no fully revealing. 
Therefore, no pure strategy trading BNE exists. In a mixed strategy BNE some traders do not 
trade. Denote the fraction ? of uninformed liquidity traders who do not trade. Given m, if ?
is bounded away from zero as N converges to infinity, then a BNE is neither efficient nor 
asymptotically efficient. The following arguments show that this is the case. 
 In a mixed strategy equilibrium the expected payoff of an informed and an 
uninformed trader must be the same. Otherwise either an informed or uninformed trader has 
a profitable deviation. (In the two trader case, their equilibrium payoffs are zero.)   
An uninformed trader only trades if he proposes an offer E[v]??. As the fraction 
(1??) of uninformed traders with this offer increases, the probability that an informed trader 
makes speculative profits increases. Consequently, their expected payoff increases while the 
these uninformed traders decreases. In a mixed strategy BNE ? is strictly bounded away 
from zero.35 QED
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